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In The Gleam of Light, Naoko Saito argues that educational thinking is at an impasse. 
On the one hand, there are educational thinkers who deny the very possibility of 
fi nding a common foundation upon which to generate shared concepts that can 
guide educational practice. Taken to an extreme, this type of thinking can lead to 
the brink of nihilism. On the other hand, there are educational thinkers who assert 
that the only route to improved practice is through a return to foundational works 
from the past. This way of thinking leads to arrested development and a premature 
closing of educational possibilities. To fi nd our way out of this impasse, Saito urges 
us to reconsider—and so reconstruct—John Dewey’s notion of growth. A recon-
structed understanding of growth will avoid “antifoundationalism or a reactionary 
turn to absolutism and the quest for certainty in democracy and education” (9).
Before launching into this project, Saito offers an overview of how Dewey’s 
notion of growth has been interpreted. This chapter persuasively argues that ways of 
interpreting growth have been unhelpfully dominated by an overly scientifi c read-
ing of intelligence. By reading intelligence this way, interpreters have prematurely 
narrowed Dewey’s philosophy of education. These interpreters have located Dewey’s 
thought between the totalizing explanatory frameworks of Hegel and Darwin. As 
such, they keep Dewey’s philosophy of education within the strict confi nes of the 
either/or of foundationalism/antifoundationalism. Saito urges us to see our way 
out of this either/or and towards a more expansive view of growth.
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A way out of this either/or, so Saito argues, is to place Dewey’s notion of 
growth in conversation with the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, in particular, with 
Stanley Cavell’s reading of Emerson. Saito introduces Cavell’s Emerson through 
Cavell’s idea of Emersonian moral perfectionism (EMP). EMP, as Saito understands 
it, is a framework that leads to self-transformation. Given this understanding, 
Saito focuses on Emerson’s idea of the attained and unattained/unattainable self. 
As Saito understands it, Emerson’s idea can be understood as follows: The self as it 
is realizes, through an encounter with a friend, a “friendly text,” that it is not the 
self that it could be, feels a sense of shame at its current constitution. This sense of 
shame then compels the self to undertake an education that leads to growth and 
development. This growth is not bound to a fi xed end state; rather the self ’s idea(l) 
of growth changes at every stage of its development. Having established that this 
is growth in EMP, Saito begins reading Dewey’s understanding of growth from 
this perspective. She places excerpts from Dewey’s writing next to excerpts from 
Emerson’s writing in order to establish a conversation. While doing this Saito also 
contests Cavell’s reluctance to place Dewey in conversation with Emerson. Cavell’s 
reluctance is motivated by his sense that in this conversation Dewey always gains 
and Emerson always loses. Saito is convinced that she can have this conversation 
without repressing Emerson’s unique voice. She is tenacious in her commitment 
to this conversation, and what she achieves through it is notable. Not only does she 
reconstruct Dewey’s notion of growth, pointing a way out of the impasse described 
above, but Saito also clearly shows the importance of Emerson in Dewey’s thought. 
Her analysis challenges and inspires—Emerson would say provokes—educational 
thinkers to revisit Emerson as a serious and powerful educational thinker. Finally, 
Saito is a champion for Stanley Cavell’s work, and I see this as particularly promis-
ing. Cavell’s potential for educational thinking is staggering. Unfortunately, I think 
Cavell’s potential—and by extension Emerson’s—for education remains under-
explored by Saito’s current book.
Although Ralph Waldo Emerson is clearly a forerunner to Dewey’s progres-
sive thought, and although bringing the thought of these thinkers together does 
lead to a broader understanding of Dewey’s concept of growth, I am not sure if it 
is necessary to introduce Cavell’s Emerson to do this work. Dewey’s work, when 
combined with Emerson’s thinking, has within it the resources to combat the nar-
row readings that lead to the impasse described above. Cavell himself recognizes 
that Dewey has a perfectionist strand in his work when he writes that Dewey’s “tire-
less combating of two forms of moralism” (these are the same one’s listed above 
in the impasse Saito describes) “constitutes Dewey as some sort of perfectionist—
though surely not an Emersonian one.”1 It is my contention that Saito can bring 
these two thinkers together without Cavell’s thought and accomplish everything 
that she set out to accomplish in this book. More importantly, in using Cavell to 
argue for Dewey with Emerson, she fails to fully appreciate the reasons why Cavell 
chooses to distance Dewey from Emerson. In the rest of this review I wish to chal-
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lenge Saito—in the spirit of perfectionist friendship—to reconsider the educative 
potential of EMP that remains unexplored when EMP is used to buttress Dewey’s 
notion of growth.
Saito focuses on only two reasons2 that Cavell gives for distancing Emerson 
from Dewey and so cannot fully address Cavell’s insistence on keeping this dis-
tance. Because of this Saito succumbs to what amounts to Cavell’s main reason for 
distancing Emerson from Dewey: Dewey—and by extension pragmatism—gains 
from the encounter with Emerson, but the unsettling force of Emerson’s thought 
becomes lost. 
Cavell repeatedly stresses that the key difference between Emerson and Dewey 
is in how they respond to skepticism. In the essay that Saito focuses most on, “What’s 
the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?,” Cavell writes, “…neither James nor 
Dewey seems to take the threat of skepticism seriously.…Pragmatism seems de-
signed to refuse to take skepticism seriously, as it refuses—in Dewey’s, if not al-
ways in James’s case—to take metaphysical distinctions seriously.”3 He repeats the 
same charge in Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, the sourcebook for Saito’s 
reading of EMP. In this work he writes, “For Dewey the philosophical interpreta-
tion of experience was cause for taking up scientifi c measures against old dualisms, 
refusing separation. For Emerson the philosophical interpretation of experience 
makes it a cause for mourning, assigning to philosophy the work of accepting the 
separation of the world, as of a child.”4 In this passage Saito focuses on the idea of 
scientifi c measures—showing, correctly, that Dewey’s understanding of science or 
method is more fl exible than a narrow positivistic reading allows for—and so ne-
glects an important term: separation. Emerson recognizes the force of the threat 
of skepticism; he feels that the world that he lives in may not be, may be separate 
from, the world that he thinks. This recognition—according to Cavell—is what 
separates Dewey from Emerson. Saito does not acknowledge this. I fi nd this par-
ticularly troubling given that Cavell considers EMP a “continuation of the chapters 
in moral philosophy that constitute Part 3 of The Claim of Reason.”5 When one sees 
EMP in this way—as Stanley Bates does in his essay on EMP6—skepticism—and 
not just the tension between the attained and unattainable self—is central to un-
derstanding Cavell’s Emerson.
Skepticism is important to Cavell because Cavell believes that attempts to 
deny skepticism or attempts to overcome skepticism lead to a denial of fi nitude or 
a denial of the human. Philosophers who do not deny the threat of skepticism—
Wittgenstein, Emerson and Thoreau are key fi gures for Cavell here—recognize the 
importance of speaking and writing in ways that keep metaphysical distinctions in 
play (acknowledging them; feeling their seduction, while not yet being seduced); 
writing that acknowledges the uncanniness of our ordinary modes of speaking; as 
if our words—to paraphrase Wittgenstein—can go lost when we don’t see meta-
physical distinctions as seductive (that is, when we either assent to them or try 
avoiding them altogether). The attempt to bridge this distinction, to overcome 
the metaphysical dualism between mind and world once and for all in order to 
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gain the surety that allows us to get on with work (the work of growth, the work of 
self-development, the work of practical power) is a move of avoidance that denies 
the uncanniness of the ordinary.7 Richard Eldridge puts it this way, “we wish for 
more—more mastery, more grounding, more surety—from the ordinary. Yet the 
ordinary…remains the only scene for our lives as such subjects. We are hence in 
relation to the ordinary both at home and not at home.”8 One can feel this uncanny 
sense of homing and homelessness in Emerson’s language. Reading “Experience,” I 
am struck by Emerson’s pairing of casual/cause, casualty/causality. He seems to be 
arguing that causality doesn’t work the way we think it does. The death of his son 
leaves no impact; it does not cause anything. If something this signifi cant does not 
cause anything, then it is impossible to have faith in causality. And yet this cannot 
be the case, because we do learn, we do change, things do affect us. But how? “We 
thrive by casualties. Our chief experiences have been casual.”9 Emerson claims that 
we cannot experience moments of learning, though we learn (this echoes the second 
paragraph of “Experience” with its intercalated days10), and we cannot learn from 
experience in any straightforward, or immediate, or non-oblique, way (his inability 
to grieve for the loss of his son).11 This leads to Sharon Cameron’s observation that 
for Emerson: “Events assume meaning (that is, connection) in the present, then, 
at tremendous cost. For our relation to meaning…is in the form of fatality.”12 This 
way of reading “Experience”—one that acknowledges separation and the threat of 
skepticism—stands in strong contrast to Saito’s reading of the same essay.
According to Saito, “Experience” is an essay that shows Emerson transcend-
ing the tragic. This way of reading doesn’t acknowledge the threat of skepticism; 
rather, in denying its strength (by achieving transcendence) it stands as what Cavell 
would call a denial of fi nitude or a denial of the human. Saito argues that Emer-
son is initially crushed by the death of his child (she proves this by quoting a let-
ter written a day after Waldo’s death and a journal entry written two months after 
the child’s death) but when it comes time to write “Experience” two years later, his 
“tone changes” and his “sense of the tragic” is “metamorphosed, toward a quiet 
resolve” (133). In a parallel way, Saito argues that “Experience” begins with a skep-
tical question and “Emerson concludes his essay with a scene of awakening: ‘I am 
at fi rst appraised….’ This is the moment of the rebirth” (159). Both ways of seeing 
this essay are factually and interpretively wrong. Two weeks after his son dies, Em-
erson writes to Caroline Sturgis, “I chiefl y grieve that I cannot grieve; that this fact 
takes no more deep hold than other facts, is as dreamlike as they…”13 It is not the 
case that Emerson uses writing as a way to transcend the tragic, moving from grief 
to quiet resolve. Emerson is plagued by the separation he feels between the world 
as he feels he should feel it and the world as he does feels it. This begins at least 
two weeks after the death of his son and is not tidily resolved in the essay “Experi-
ence.” Again, the line that Saito quotes as the conclusion of “Experience” happens 
ten paragraphs before the essay’s conclusion. The actual conclusion (composed of 
lines that form a touchstone in Cavell’s understanding of EMP) reads, 
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I know that the world I converse with in the city and in the farms, is not 
the world I think. I observe that difference and shall observe it. One day, 
I shall know the value and law of this discrepance.…Never mind the ridi-
cule, never mind the defeat: up again, old heart!—it seems to say,—there 
is victory yet for all justice; and the true romance which the world exists 
to realize, will be the transformation of genius into practical power.14
This conclusion is a far cry from overcoming skepticism through rebirth. No, this 
conclusion reasserts Emerson’s troubled relationship between knowing and expe-
rience. Instead of offering the reader this Emerson—the Emerson who feels the 
threat of skepticism; Cavell’s Emerson—Saito’s Emerson is tame. He is able to use 
philosophy as a means to overcoming grief and tragedy and so attains his next self 
(a self that Saito writes will itself need to be developed in the light of another idea[l] 
of selfhood). His genius has been transformed into practical power; he is victori-
ous; he is—what Cavell would call—a pragmatist.
 This Emerson is not Cavell’s Emerson. For Cavell, Emerson’s voice has still 
not been heard, because he, “calls for is something we do not want to hear.”15 What 
he calls for, and what EMP calls for, is an education that acknowledges the threat of 
skepticism and avoids the seductive call to transcend the tragic. Acknowledging the 
threat of skepticism would mean accepting that we are prone to disclaim responsibil-
ity for our world, our language and our education, because we secretly feel that the 
“discrepance” between our mind and the world is too much to overcome.16 When 
we do not acknowledge this feeling, we lose sight of the fact that for Cavell skepti-
cism is a continuous threat, not something that can be overcome or transcended. 
The educational implications of this are staggering. Taking EMP seriously means 
taking responsibility for creating a shared world of meaning even in the face of the 
very real threat that we will not succeed. To succeed would mean seeing how the 
lives of others—especially the lives of students who are coming to terms with their 
life in language—“drift between their own inexpressiveness and my inaccuracy in 
responding to them.”17 When a teacher sees this way, she will see that what she may 
have hitherto considered an error or a misstep on the part of a student may point 
to her own limitations. This way of teaching always feels the threat of the tragic as 
a real threat, and sees education not as a means to overcoming this threat, but as a 
means to expanding our powers of articulation and our ability to respond to oth-
ers. An education for articulation and responsiveness—as diffi cult and uncertain 
as it may be—seems to be closer to the education that Cavell’s thought calls for.
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